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Illicit Financial Flows: Concepts and
Definition
Irene Musselli and Elisabeth Bürgi Bonanomi
The report builds on knowledge gained in the interdisciplinary research project ‘Curbing Illicit
Financial Flows (IFFs) from Resource-Rich Developing Countries: Improving Natural Resource
Governance to Finance the SDGs’. This project was funded through the Swiss Programme for
Research on Global Issues for Development (www.r4d.ch) by the Swiss Agency for Development
and Cooperation (SDC) and the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF). For more details, visit 
https://curbing-iffs.org/ and http://www.r4d.ch/modules/employment/curbing-illicit-financial-
flows. We thank our colleagues in the project and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful
comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript.
 
1. Introduction
1 Countries have committed to ‘significantly’  reducing ‘illicit  financial flows’ (IFFs) by
2030 in accordance with Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target 16.4. Yet there is
still  no  consensus  regarding  the  concept  and  definition  of  IFFs.  The  dominant
narrative, which we deconstruct in Section 2, distinguishes between a ‘narrow’ and a
‘broad’ definition of IFFs (for a review of the debate, see Forstater, 2018a). In a ‘narrow’
sense, IFFs refer to cross-border financial transfers ‘that have a clear connection with
illegality’ (World Bank, 2016, 1).1 The ‘broad’ definition of IFFs stretches the concept
further by including transactions that are deemed unethical, even if not illegal in the
assessed  jurisdiction  (High  Level  Panel  on  Illicit  Financial  Flows  from  Africa,  2015;
Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt, 2016; UNCTAD, 2014).2 Making such
a clear distinction in relation to tax-motivated IFFs is fraught with serious conceptual
problems, as discussed in the following analysis. Beyond the narrow/broad definitional
debate, several questions remain with respect to the following (Erikkson, 2017): (1) the
type of cross-border transfers that qualify as IFFs—whether money flows or anything
with monetary value, from loans embedded in private contracts to smuggled physical
goods; (2) the type and degree of illegality involved; and (3) whether the source, the
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use, or the transfer mechanism of a cross-border transfer should be assessed as illegal.
The debates point to major divergences and disagreement on all these points. In the
end,  the  definition  of  IFFs  remains  clouded  in  ‘open  questions,  uncertainties,  and
inconsistencies’  (Erikkson, 2017).  On the one hand, this  definitional uncertainty has
served,  and still  serves,  the ‘IFF agenda’.  Looking back,  it  has been instrumental  in
building political momentum around the IFF issue. Building that momentum required
emphasis  on  aggregates,  and  postponement  of  technical  disagreements  about  the
specifics  of  the issue at  stake.  Looking forward,  this  definitional  ‘openness’  ensures
some built-in flexibility in the IFF debate, which is adaptable to the fast pace of legal
reform, and to changes in underlying policy perceptions. On the other hand, lack of
clarity and agreement about what constitutes IFFs can give rise to misunderstandings
and policy disagreement. It is a stumbling block to any effort to rigorously gauge the
magnitude of IFFs. Further, it hinders the design of effective policy responses to curb
IFFs, since regulatory responses require clarity as regards targeted actors, techniques,
and motives for IFFs. 
2 Against this background, this article reviews and challenges some key tenets of the IFF
debate,  and  articulates  some  lines  of  legal  reasoning  that  can  help  to  define  the
boundaries of what constitutes illicit flows (or not). It does so with reference to three
hotly  contested  areas  in  the  debate:  the  legal/illegal  distinction in  relation  to  tax-
motivated IFFs; the tension between ‘development’ and legal approaches to IFFs; and how to
reconcile aggregate and disaggregate approaches under the IFF agenda. In each of these
areas,  the  analysis  briefly  rehearses  the  state  of  the  debate,  challenges  some
entrenched assumptions, and presents ideas that help to reconcile conflicting views. It
concludes with some summary observations.
 
2. Tax-Motivated IFFs: Moving Beyond a Polarised
Debate
3 It is customary in the literature and in policy debates to distinguish between a ‘narrow’
and a ‘broad’ definition of IFFs (for a review, see Forstater, 2018a, 4–7).  The former
requires a breach of the law (‘illegal’ activities). The latter encompasses unethical acts
that  are  deemed  to  be  formally  lawful,  if  unregulated  (‘illicit’  activities).  This
distinction  has  gained  wide  acceptance  in  the  debate  on  tax-motivated  IFFs,  with
different  outcomes.  Proponents  of  the  ‘narrow’  definition  argue  that  transfers
associated  with  tax  evasion (illegal)  qualify as  IFFs,  while  tax  avoidance schemes
(formally compliant with ‘the letter of law’) do not, even if unethical (World Bank 2016,
2;  Forstater,  2018a;  2018b).  Advocates of  the ‘broad’  approach argue that  avoidance
practices may still fall under a ‘broad’ definition of IFFs that includes unethical (though
allegedly lawful) practices (High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, 2015;
Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt, 2016; UNCTAD, 2014). 
4 While the narrow/broad distinction is conceptually appealing,3 it  is,  to a significant
extent, misleading. In real life, it is hard to draw a line between ‘illegal’ and ‘illicit’
activities: as discussed below, so-called illicit activities often involve illegal elements.
This  is  particularly  so  in  the  area  of  tax  avoidance:  the  legal  assessment  of  tax
avoidance  practices  is  a  circumstantial  process  of  interpretation  and  constant
adjustment, in a dynamic and adaptive regulatory environment. This line of reasoning
is detailed  below.  The  proceeding  analysis  first  clarifies  the  use  of  key  terms—tax
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evasion and avoidance. It then critically reappraises the analytical distinction between
‘illegal’ and ‘illicit’ with regard to tax evasion and avoidance practices. Finally, it seeks
to advance beyond that distinction by endorsing a definition of tax-motivated IFFs that,
while  anchored  in  law,  is  dynamic  and  adaptive  to  policy  changes,  and  levels  the
playing  field  between  countries  with  different  lawmaking  and  law-enforcement
capacities. 
 
2.1 Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance
5 For analytical purposes, it is useful to retain some legally relevant terms and concepts
from the perspective under critique. In line with the dominant framing of the debate,
the  terms  ‘tax  evasion’  and  ‘tax  avoidance’  are  here  used  to  denote  different  tax
behaviours.4 UK  Treasury  Minister  Gauke  drew  the  following  distinction  during  a
parliamentary debate in 2010—a distinction upheld in the UK 2015 government paper
on tax avoidance (HM Treasury, 2015):
6 Tax evasion occurs when people or businesses deliberately do not pay the taxes that
they legally owe. They can do so by underreporting income, over-reporting expenses,
or simply not paying taxes owed. Tax evasion encompasses the ‘hidden economy’ in
which ‘people conceal their presence or taxable sources of income’ (HM Treasury 2015,
5). 
7 Tax avoidance involves ‘bending the rules of the tax system to gain a tax advantage that
Parliament never intended’ (HM Treasury 2015, 5). It results in ‘compliance with the
letter but not the spirit of the law’ (HC Deb 12 July 2010 c706, reported in Seely, 2018).
Tax avoidance practices typically entail ‘taking advantage of the technicalities of a tax
system or of mismatches between two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing
tax liability’  (European Commission, 2012).  This type of avoidance typically involves
highly artificial and contrived arrangements whose sole or main purpose is to reduce
or  eliminate  tax  liability.5 The  practice  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  ‘aggressive  tax
planning’  (European  Commission,  2012;  2015;  2017),  or  ‘abusive’/‘aggressive  tax
avoidance’  in  order  to  distinguish it  from so-called  legitimate  tax  planning.  At  the
global  level,  it  substantially  overlaps  with  ‘base  erosion  and  profit  shifting’  (BEPS)
under the G20/OECD BEPS programme. 
8 While this taxonomy brings some theoretical clarity to the debate, it is important to
acknowledge that the boundaries between tax avoidance and tax evasion remain
blurred in day-to-day reality. In practice, there is a ‘continuum of tax aggressiveness’
from tax avoidance to outright tax evasion (European Commission, 2017, 23; Hearson
2014,  7),  and much depends  on the  circumstances  of  the  case.  Legal  assessment  of
avoidance practices is seldom simple or obvious, as discussed below. 
 
2.2 Tax Avoidance: Illegal or Illicit?
9 As defined above,  tax evasion directly breaches the law. Tax avoidance exploits tax
loopholes and mismatches to circumvent a tax law without directly violating the ‘letter
of the law’. Building on this definition, some consider avoidance practices outside the
scope of IFFs, lacking in their view a clear connection with illegality (World Bank, 2016,
2;  Forstater,  2018a;  2018b);  others  argue  that  avoidance  practices  still  fall  within  a
broad definition of IFFs that encompasses commercial practices perceived as unethical,
Illicit Financial Flows: Concepts and Definition
International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement, 12.1 | 2020
3
even if legal—termed ‘illicit’ practices (High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from
Africa, 2015; Independent Expert on the Effects of Foreign Debt, 2016; UNCTAD 2014).
This view resonates with basic notions of law versus justice, and is widely upheld by
economists and commentators (for a review, see Mehrotra, 2018). 
10 The distinction between illegal  and illicit  tax behaviour,  and between ‘narrow’  and
‘broad’  definitions  of  IFFs,  is  well  established  and  intuitively  appealing.  Yet  it  is
problematic since it mis-characterises the legal terrain by unduly restricting the legal
sphere and the legal process of interpretation. It can be criticised on several grounds. 
11 First,  as  extensively  elaborated  by  Picciotto  (2018;  2018b),  legal  assessment  of  tax
avoidance practices is a matter of interpretation. This points to some ‘indeterminacy in
rules’ and to ‘the scope within law to legitimise contradictory decisions’ (McBarnet and
Whelan,  1991,  852‒53).6 Note in this  respect that tax rules often embed commercial
concepts  that  require  fact-intensive  assessment  of  underlying  business  structures.
Determining  whether  a  corporate  tax  position  is  correct  is  generally  a  complex,
context-specific endeavour, requiring a number of judgment calls by the taxpayer, the
tax administration, and eventually the court if the matter is litigated. In some respects,
it  is  only  the  legal  challenge  that  determines  if  the  tax  filing  position  is  correct
(Quentin, 2017; Devereux et al., 2012). Note also that several tax provisions are in the
form  of  circumstantial,  open-ended  standards  that  call  for  a  balancing  of  multiple
factors to determine whether a position is illegal, requiring principled decisions and
purposive interpretation. Ultimately, it is incumbent on the revenue authority or the
court  to  authoritatively  categorise  the  facts  to  place  them under  a  particular  legal
classification. 
12 It  is  important  to  note  that  this  interpretative  process  is  not  value-free:  when
interpreting a specific law provision, judges typically seek to determine the ‘intention’
of legislation, viewing legal terms in light of the objectives and rationale of the law. By
interpreting the law purposively, a court may strike down an arrangement that follows
the letter of the law, but violates its intention. Judges use different approaches and
techniques to do so. Depending on the legal system in place in a given country, these
techniques  include  statutory  interpretation  and  construction,  judicial  anti-abuse
doctrines, and anti-abuse theories of law.7 This process of legal interpretation per se
problematises distinctions between the ‘letter’  and ‘spirit’  of  the law,  on which the
illegal/illicit  distinction  largely  rests  (see  also  Harmon  et  al.,  2015;  McBarnet  and
Whelan, 1991; Minto, 2016).8
13 Second, in tax matters, the reach of the law has markedly extended into tax avoidance
areas. As a consequence, the distinction between tax evasion (illegal) and tax avoidance
(formerly perceived as legal) is blurring somewhat. This reflects the increased pace and
breadth of regulatory reform in tax law over the past years—under the BEPS agenda, in
particular. Two major developments are worth noting in this respect: the enactment of
specifically  targeted anti-avoidance legislation,  and the introduction of  general  anti-
abuse  rules (GAAR).  Many jurisdictions have introduced specifically  targeted laws to
close  regulatory  loopholes  and  redress  mismatches  that  provided  opportunities  for
regulatory  arbitrage  and  abuse;  these  include  transfer-pricing  rules,  interest
deductibility  rules,  thin  capitalisation  rules,  controlled  foreign  company  rules,  and
anti-hybrid  rules,  as  well  as  ‘switch-over’  rules  designed  to  prevent  ‘double  non-
taxation’ of certain dividends, capital gains, and profits.9 These rules defeat the most
common methods used by companies to aggressively avoid taxes, including through
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artificial  schemes  that  shift  income  offshore  through  interest  payments,  royalty
payments, and strategic transfer pricing. Going a step further, many countries have
enacted  so-called  ‘catch-all’  rules,  typically  in  the  form  of  GAARs  that  rule  out
transactions designed to avoid tax.10 A GAAR is a ‘provision of last resort’ that can be
invoked by a tax authority ‘to strike down unacceptable tax avoidance practices that
would otherwise comply with the terms and statutory interpretation of the ordinary
tax law’  (Waerzeggers and Hillier,  2016,  1).  GAARs are meant to ‘strike down those
otherwise  lawful  practices  that  are  found  to  be  carried  out  in  a  manner  which
undermines the intention of the tax law’ (ibid.). All tax arrangements that satisfy the
relevant provisions of a given tax code yet simultaneously undermine its intention are
potential  targets  for  GAARS—thus,  possibly  making  them unlawful.  This  per  se
problematises  the  statement  that  tax  avoidance  is  legal.  Certainly,  businesses  will
adjust and find new, more subtle forms of elusion. Targeted anti-avoidance legislation
can actually create avoidance opportunities through new loopholes and mismatches,
absent a general anti-abuse rule. Absent ‘catch-all’ GAAR-type rules, the regulation of
tax avoidance typically engenders a ‘balloon effect’: regulators squeeze the balloon in
one place only to see it inflate elsewhere. But the law will seek to adapt, resembling a
cat-and-mouse game of constant pursuit, near captures, and repeated escapes. 
14 Third,  it  is  important  to  stress  that  ‘illegality’  is  a  complex  concept  that  must  be
assessed in the context of complex, multi-layered legal settings. Public discourses tend
to conflate illegality and criminality.  According to this logic,  tax avoidance is  legal,
since normally it is not a crime, and thus should not invite legal sanctions. This line of
reasoning is problematic, however. The notion of ‘illegality’ not only embraces actions
contravening criminal law, but also violations of civil or administrative law. To put it
clearly, some actions may be unlawful even if they are not criminal. Take the example
of  aggressive  tax  optimisation  schemes:  in  the  mainstream  public  discourse,  these
practices are deemed formally legal. Yet, as discussed above, under some circumstances
the tax authority has the right to challenge the tax arrangement and deny the tax
advantage that an ‘abusive’ scheme would otherwise enable. In this case, tax avoidance
does not amount to a criminal tax offense. At worst, it may expose the party in question
to  civil  penalties.  Yet  the  counteracted  scheme  can  be  said  to  be  unlawful  in
administrative terms, to the extent that the tax authority has the regulatory power to
strike it down. It is also important to stress that ‘criminal’ is, per se, a multi-layered
and nuanced concept: most jurisdictions provide for different classifications of criminal
offenses—for example, crime, délit, and contravention in civil law countries,11 or felony
and misdemeanour in Anglo-American law. To sum up, what is commonly presented as
legal or ‘quasi-legal’ is often technically unlawful, even if the conduct only amounts to
an infraction not liable to a prison sentence.
15 Finally, the mainstream public discourse tends to mix up two questions that should be
kept conceptually distinct: the question of legality in theory, and that of whether the
existing  law  is  being  properly  applied  and  enforced.  As  discussed,  in  many  cases  tax
avoidance may be unlawful in contexts where tax law has attained a certain level of
sophistication. Nevertheless, many cases go undetected and are never brought before a
court. Further, when a case is litigated, there may be a degree of judgment involved in
assessing what activities are ‘abusive’ or not, creating uncertainty about the outcome of
litigation.12 Note also that there can be many delays before a case is finally litigated,
and  decisions  are  often  weakly  enforced.  In  these  circumstances,  many  avoidance
schemes succeed ‘by default’  in  the sense that  they are simply not  litigated or  are
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drawn out indefinitely (Quentin,  2017).  For this reason,  businesses may deliberately
choose risky tax positions if they have a perceived likelihood of success. This explains
the mass-marketing in the UK of avoidance schemes with as little as a 50 per cent
chance  of  success  if  challenged  in  court  (House  of  Commons  Committee  of  Public
Accounts, 2013).13 This risk appetite accounts for the persistent ‘tax gap’ between tax
collected and due (Seely, 2018),14 not only in countries with weak governance systems,
but also in countries with well-developed legal systems. 
16 These  examples  highlight  the  need  to  reconsider  simplified  ‘illegal’  versus ‘illicit’
distinctions (and tax ‘evasion’ versus tax ‘avoidance’ distinctions) in the IFF debate. The
question of what is legal, and what is not, ‘is a set of grey areas with many nuances and
disagreements’ (Shaxson, 2019). In the end, it is hard to draw a line ex ante15 between
tax evasion and tax avoidance, or between avoidance activities that are unlawful or
legal:  the legal  assessment of  tax avoidance practices is  a  circumstantial  process of
interpretation  and  constant  adjustment,  in  a  dynamic  and  adaptive  regulatory
environment. 
17 Two observations follow from the above.
18 First,  what is  genuinely at  stake,  today,  is  not the illegal  versus illicit  dilemma, but
uncertainty over the ex-ante legal characterisation of tax arrangements. As previously
discussed,  the  pace  of  regulatory  reform  in  tax  law  has  accelerated  over  the  past
decade. In a fast-moving regulatory environment, what was lawful yesterday may be
unlawful today,  and legality is,  increasingly,  a matter of judicial  and administrative
interpretation.  The  shift  in  tax  law  from  detailed  legal  drafting  towards  broad
purposive  directives  such  as  general  anti-abuse  rules  may  possibly  exacerbate  this
feature of the legal system. GAARs are inherently vague and purposive, afford decision
makers more discretion than detailed rules, and may generate some uncertainty about
the tax treatment of business transactions.16 
19 Second, the focus on the illegal versus illicit distinction may conceal something else of
critical  import:  capacity  gaps  regarding  tax  administration  and  prosecution,
particularly  in  resource-strained  jurisdictions.  These  gaps  may  lead  to  lack  of
regulation or weak legal enforcement. A narrow definition of tax-motivated IFFs that
only considers the positive law applied in the assessed jurisdiction fails to consider the
variability of administrative and enforcement capacity across countries. As a result, it
neglects IFFs in countries with lower tax administration capacity, lower prosecution
capacity, and less sophisticated legal systems (Chowla and Falcao, 2016).
 
2.3 Moving beyond ‘Illegal’ versus ‘Illicit’: Evolving Legal Norms and
Principles 
20 These considerations  show the need to  move beyond simplified distinctions  (illegal
versus illicit) that fail to bring clarity to the debate. How, then, to move forward? A
pragmatic way out is to reconstruct the ‘broad’ definition of IFFs in a way that anchors
that definition to legal concepts and constructs, as described in the following. 
21 On the one hand, the definition of IFFs should be anchored in legal concepts, rather
than ethics, in order to avoid unproductive subjective arguments over moral values. It
is thus important to define the boundaries of what constitutes illicit flows according to
concrete legal understandings, making reference to legal rules and legal constructs. 
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22 On the other hand, the corresponding legal assessment of IFFs should be broad. First, it
should  move  beyond  ‘bright  line’  rules  and  also  encompass  legal  standards  and
doctrines that set the terms for the legal assessment. As further discussed in Section
3.2.1,  bright-line  rules  are  clearly  defined  rules  about  what  is  permissible  or  not,
leaving  little  room  for  varying  interpretation;  standards  are  imprecise  and
circumstantial  and require  determination of  the legal  outcome based on principled
decisions.17 Both are enforceable parts of the positive law of the State. Reference to
standards  means  emphasising  commonly  shared  anti-abuse  principles  that  can  be
found  across  domestic  legal  systems.  These  principles  can  be  considered  the legal
benchmark against which to define the contours of what constitutes IFFs for reasons of
policy  analysis,  even  in  those  countries  where  avoidance  arrangements  are  not
regulated.18 Note  that  while  (bright-line)  rules  are  ‘precise  and  ex  ante  in  nature’
(Casey  and  Niblett,  2017,  1407),  standards  are  ‘circumstantial  and  open-ended’,
requiring determination of the law’s content only ex post, once the judge has made a
fact-specific determination (Parisi, 2004, 510).19 Second, the legal assessment should not
be  confined  to  the  positive  law  in  force  in  the  assessed  jurisdiction:  it  should
comparatively refer to major legal developments in other jurisdictions. There might be
(rare)  cases  where  the  legal  system in  question is  so  rudimentary  that  it  does  not
integrate  any  anti-abuse  rule  or  principle  at  all,  leaving  avoidance  practices
unregulated.  Yet aggressive avoidance practices still  go against  rules and standards
established across most jurisdictions. For policy purposes, the legal definition of IFFs
should refer to these widely recognised rules and norms. It is important to note, in this
respect,  that  IFFs  involve  cross-border  transfers  that  straddle  jurisdictions.  Their
legality is to be assessed with respect to the laws of different countries—transit, home
and  host  countries.  Furthermore,  as  discussed  in  the  following  section,  the  legal
assessment may also take into account rules and principles of public international law,
including  human  rights  law.  As  discussed  in  Section  3.2.1,  reference  to  public
international  law may further expand the legal  terrain,  extending to practices that
currently stand at the periphery of the IFF debate.
23 Along these lines, for definitional purposes, ‘illegality’ should be flexibly interpreted
with reference to national or international law and evolving anti-abuse standards, with a
view to reflecting the dynamic, evolving nature of legal processes. In tax matters, this
implies  considering  the  wealth  of  legal  principles  and  statutory  enactments  that
collectively challenge the widely held assumption that tax avoidance is legal while tax
evasion is not. The previous analysis has drawn attention to lines of judicial reasoning,
judicial doctrines, and statutory enactments aimed at countering abuse of law and tax
avoidance.  Based on this  wealth  of  legal  material,  it  is  possible  to  identify  general
principles that are crucial to the assessment of tax-motivated IFFs. In particular, GAAR
provisions reject the idea that taxpayers are free to use their ingenuity to reduce their
tax bills by any lawful means. Instead, they stipulate that abuse or misuse of tax laws is
not a lawful course of action. Some GAARs also seek to establish the ‘substance over
form’ doctrine in tax law. A key reference norm is that of realigning taxation with
economic  substance  and  value  creation.  That  is  also  the  stated  aim  of  the  BEPS
programme. Interestingly, this overriding BEPS principle echoes the legal doctrines of
‘economic substance’ and ‘substance over form’ that have long been a part of the tax
law of many countries.20 In some respects, soft law legal instruments are integrating
long-standing  anti-abuse  principles  into  the  ‘mainstream’  policy  discourse.  In  turn,
these  principles  set  norms  that  inform lawmaking.  Such  construction  of  ‘illegality’
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(and IFFs) tends to blur the distinction between soft and hard law. Most importantly, by
referring to international standards and principles of law, it levels the playing field
between countries with different regulatory and law enforcement capacity to seize and
sanction tax avoidance. 
24 Questions remain as to whether and how such definition of  IFFs,  anchored in legal
concepts,  can  be  reconciled  with  a  ‘development’  perspective  on  IFFs,  which  goes
beyond the legal characterisation of activities. This matter is discussed below.
 
3. Development and Legal Perspectives on IFFs:
Bridging the Gap
25 A further perspective is relevant to efforts to determine what constitutes IFFs. In order
to  resolve  the  narrow/broad  controversy,  some  observers  argue  for  adopting  a
functional, purposive interpretation of IFFs. They move beyond the question ‘What are
we measuring?’, and instead emphasise the question ‘Why are we measuring?’, so as to
redirect attention to revenue (or, broadly, development) impacts of relevant income/
wealth transfers, and away from narrow discussion of the strict illegality (or not) of
such  transfers.  The  following  analysis  briefly  sketches  the  main  tenets  of  this
‘development approach’ to IFFs. It then seeks to ‘translate’ some key insights from that
approach into legal terms. 
 
3.1 A ‘Development Approach’ to IFFs
26 Under a ‘development approach’ to IFFs, the key issue in defining IFFs is the revenue
impact of the flows. More broadly, the key underlying concern is that of ‘the impact of
illicit financial flows […] on the economic, social and political stability and development
of societies’ (UN General Assembly, 2016, 1). Pursuant to this approach, IFFs are defined
as  international  financial  flows  that  have  a  negative  net  impact  on  sustainable
development,  when  all  their  direct  and  indirect  effects  are  taken  into  account
(Blankenburg  and  Khan,  2012;  Miyandazi  and  Ronceray,  2018).  This  definitional
approach focuses on the revenue (or, broadly, the development) impact of transfers,
rather than merely on the illegality of transfers. Its central question is that of whether,
or  to  what  extent,  financial  flows  damage  the  development  of  poorer  countries,
irrespective of whether the flows are legal, illegal, or fall in a grey area. 
27 The ‘development impact’ approach has two key corollaries. 
28 On the one hand, a development-focused definition of  IFFs potentially encompasses
transactions  that,  although  prima  facie lawful  (until  proven  unlawful),  may  have
adverse revenue impacts on developing countries. The reach of the IFF agenda would
expand to  include such issues  as  business  tax  incentives,  price  unfairness,  and the
allocation of  taxing rights under double-tax agreements.21 These arrangements may
erode  developing  countries’  tax  base  and  result  in  significant  revenue  loss.  For
example, it has been estimated that US tax treaties cost their developing-country treaty
counterparts at least USD 1.7 billion in revenue every year (de Mooij et al., 2015, at 185).
Under a ‘development approach’ to IFFs, these outflows constitute IFFs, irrespective of
their legal characterisation. This approach resonates with the broad IFF agenda pushed
by the pan-African institutions working on IFFs in Africa.22 
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29 On the other hand, the development definition of IFFs excludes flows that, although in
breach  of  some  laws,  have  no  negative  net  impacts  on  sustainable  development
(Miyandazi  and  Ronceray,  2018).  It  has  been  observed,  in  this  respect,  that  rule-
violating transactions are not all equally harmful (Blankenburg and Khan, 2012; OECD,
2018).  For  example, informal  value  transfers  are  especially  important  in  countries
where the formal banking system is too expensive for the poor. Transactions conducted
through these informal  systems of  money transfer  do not  fit  under  a  development
definition  of  IFFs,  even  if  illegal  under  domestic  law  (Erikkson,  2017).  Similarly,
unreported artisanal mining may feature a high degree of subsistence-level criminal
activity: it provides income for people lacking credible alternative livelihoods, and the
profits may be reinvested in the local economy (OECD, 2018). One step further, some
authors  argue  that  corruption-related  IFFs  also  require  nuanced  distinctions.  They
observe that, for example, bribes meant to bypass unproductive red tape may enable
economic activities, even if they undermine the rule of law (Miyandazi and Ronceray,
2018; see also Khan and Andreoni, 2018). In specific cases, some scholars acknowledge,
it is also possible to identify exceptions to the general harmful nature of tax abuses: for
example, profit shifting to avoid illegitimate expropriation by a predatory regime in a
fragile  state  may  undermine  the  tax  base,  but  also  make  investment  viable
(Blankenburg  and  Khan,  2012;  Khan  and  Andreoni,  2018;  Miyandazi  and  Ronceray,
2018).  Overall,  the  point  is  made  that  IFFs  may  be  driven  by  ‘inappropriate  or
contradictory formal rules, or low capabilities of firms in developing countries’ (Khan
and Andreoni, 2018). IFFs thus reflect structural drivers that cannot be changed in the
short-to-medium term without hurting the local economy or social set-up. Tackling or
diminishing  these  flows  could  prove  difficult  and  the  development  impact  may  be
negative in the short to mid-term. 
30 The ‘development approach’ contributes a useful policy orientation to the debate by
drawing a distinguishing line between harmful and non-harmful patterns of conduct
under the IFF agenda. Yet it blurs the connection with illegality, raising the question of
how to reconcile ‘development’ and ‘legal’ perspectives on IFFs. It is important to tackle
this question and establish ways to bridge between legal constructs and development
perspectives, as discussed below. 
 
3.2 Legal ‘Translations’
31 In order to reconcile development and legal views of IFFs, it is useful to explore how to
translate some of the insights from the ‘development approach’ into legal terms. The
objective is  to enrich the legal  debate on IFFs,  while  keeping the definition of  IFFs
firmly anchored to legal concepts.
32 Overall,  the  development  approach  encourages  moving  beyond  formalistic,  static
conceptions of IFFs and towards more purposive interpretations, linking IFFs to efforts
to mobilise domestic resources for development. More precisely, it firmly embeds the
IFF agenda in the ‘sustainable development’ agenda, in particular to the 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development and the SDGs23 as well as the Addis Ababa Action Agenda
(AAAA).24 These  agendas  explicitly  anchor  IFFs  in  domestic  resource-mobilisation
efforts. The political commitments enshrined in the 2030 Agenda and the AAAA are
legally significant as ‘soft law’. For example, they assist in interpreting existing treaty
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rules  and  contribute  to  the  gradual  formation  of  new  rules  through  the  political
lawmaking process.25 
33 Such  embedding  of  the  IFF  debate  in  the  sustainable  development  framework  has
concrete legal implications,  in at least two respects.  First,  it  implies some shift  from
clearly defined (‘bright line’) rules to standards, and from categorisation to complex balancing
tests (Section 3.2.1). Second, it leads to a focus on outcome and impact assessments that go
beyond  legal  formalisms  (Section  3.2.2).  These  developments  and  their  concrete
implications are discussed below with specific reference to IFFs.
 
3.2.1 From ‘Bright Line’ Rules to Complex Balancing Tests
34 What does a shift from bright-line rules (categorisation) to standards (balancing tests)
mean,  and  how  does  it  apply  to  the  legal  assessment  of  what  counts  as  IFFs?  As
mentioned, bright-line rules are clearly defined rules about what is permissible or not,
leaving  little  room  for  varying  interpretation.  Standards  are  imprecise  and  open-
textured and require determination of the legal outcome based on principled decisions.
In practice, legal systems are likely to combine both (McBarnet and Whelan, 1991, 852).
The rules/standards distinction echoes the distinction between legal ‘categorization’
and ‘balancing’: categorisation is rule-like, while balancing corresponds to standards
(Sullivan,  1992,  59).  More precisely,  categorisation is  ‘taxonomic’:  it  sets  bright-line
boundaries and classifies facts as falling on one side or the other (Sullivan, 1992, 59).
Balancing tests, by contrast, require weighing and balancing multiple factors in a legal
case, and the legal outcome depends on how the judge balances competing normative
interests.  Open-textured  standards  and  balancing  invite  ‘particularisation’  in  the
application of the law, allowing exceptions to be made when individual circumstances
appear  to  call  for  them.26 Further,  they  call  for ‘systemic  law  interpretation  and
systemic lawmaking’ (Bürgi Bonanomi, 2015b, 29; 2015a). ‘Systemic law interpretation’
implies  open-textured  rules  interpreted  systematically  by  reference  to  other  legal
regimes  relevant  in  the  context  (ibid.).  Systemic  lawmaking  requires  ‘lawmaking
procedures that are shaped by the “duty to include”, the “duty to structure and weigh”,
and the “duty to develop optimal options”’ (Bürgi Bonanomi, 2015b, 29).27 The quest is
for regulatory  coherence  and  convergence,  beyond  legal  fragmentation  (Bürgi
Bonanomi 2015b, 29–30; Cottier et al., 2011). 
35 With specific reference to IFFs, the balancing of competing rights or interests may lead
to authorising otherwise unlawful conduct. It leads to qualifying and/or narrowing the
scope  of  IFFs,  with  an  eye  to  the  underlying  factual  circumstances  or  competing
policies  at  stake.  Complex  balancing  tests  have  already  begun  informing  legal
assessments  of  what  counts  as  ‘illegal’.  This  may  be  seen  regarding  rule-violating
activities that provide income for people that lack credible alternative livelihoods—for
example, illegal harvesting, unrecorded artisanal mining, informal cross-border trade,
and informal value transfers. In the judicial assessment of these practices, the need to
satisfy basic needs may be considered an attenuating circumstance that lessens the
severity of a crime and results in reduced charges. Assessment may entail ‘criminal law
defences of necessity or duress’, whereby external constraints that compel a defendant
to transgress the law ‘lessen or extinguish culpability’ (Gilman, 2013, 498; Law Reform
Commission, 2006). Going further, the ‘right to life’ may be asserted, for example, to
justify poaching or illegal resource extraction (and associated trade) by impoverished
peasants  in  contexts  of  extreme  duress.  Indeed,  from  a  human  rights  perspective,
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access to the basic conditions necessary to sustain life is a human right.28 It translates
into  the  ‘right  to  life’,  inextricably  linked  to  the  right  to  food,  as  protected  by
international and regional treaties,  customary international law, and domestic legal
systems. Balancing is here a matter of enforcing domestic laws in ways that do not
compromise the human rights obligations of states.29
36 The balancing of competing rights and interests may also serve to expand the legal
scope of IFFs beyond its current reach. As regards tax-motivated IFFs, sustainability
concerns encourage examination of adverse ‘spillover effects’ of a country’s tax regime
on other countries. Spillovers refer to ‘the impact that one jurisdiction’s tax rules or
practices  has  [sic]  on  others’  (IMF,  2014,  12).  Concerns  arise,  in  particular,  when
jurisdictions with attractive tax regimes divert taxable income from other countries,
affecting  the  ability  of  tax  administrations  in  more  fragile  states  to  raise  revenue
needed  for  sustainable  development.  Translated  into  legal  terms,  the  tax  spillover
debate requires the weighing of competing rights and obligations under international
law. On the one hand, under deeply entrenched fiscal sovereignty principles, states are
free to tax corporations as they wish—this is  a matter of domestic concern. On the
other,  states  have  extraterritorial  obligations  in  the  area  of  economic,  social  and
cultural  rights  (ETO  Consortium,  2013).  In  particular,  countries  whose  internal  tax
policies have adverse livelihood impacts on other countries may stand in breach of
their duty of international cooperation and assistance (for a review, see Lusiani and
Cosgrove,  2017).30 Under  human rights  law,  unaddressed  tax  spillovers  may  breach
governments’ obligations to refrain from conduct that impairs the enjoyment of human
rights  abroad  (International  Bar  Association,  2013;  Lusiani  and  Cosgrove,  2017).  It
would also be interesting to consider the possible legal outcomes of transposing the ‘no
harm’ international law principle from environmental spillovers to tax spillovers.31 As
of today, the balance has been struck in favour of the tax sovereignty of the enacting
state: in the dominant policy discourse, financial flows driven by tax competition and
legitimate tax-planning schemes do not count as illicit,  whatever their development
impacts,  since  tax  rates  and  incentives  are  largely  perceived  as  a  matter  of  fiscal
sovereignty. It remains possible that the balance may tilt towards an equitability focus,
driven by sustainability concerns, in the future.32 Much depends on the legal weight
that  decision  makers  and  judges  give  to  international  human  rights  obligations,
particularly with respect to economic, social and cultural rights. 
37 To  sum  up,  embedding  the  IFF debate  in  the  sustainable  development  framework
increases the need to weigh and balance multiple factors when assessing what counts
as illicit flows. The integration of sustainability concerns into the legal definition of
IFFs  encourages  evaluation  of  socio-economic  circumstances  that  may  excuse
otherwise wrongful conduct—‘particularisation’ in the application of the law. Further,
it  calls  for  ‘systemic’  interpretation and ‘systemic’  lawmaking,  making reference to
other relevant legal regimes, for example by importing human rights claims into tax
law. 
 
3.2.2 From Form to Substance
38 Going further, integration of sustainability concerns into domestic and international
law—and the related shift from rules to standards, and from categorisation to balancing
—has ramifications for the type of legal reasoning involved. It calls for a less formalist,
technically oriented conception of the law, and instead favours more ‘substantive’ legal
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reasoning. ‘Legal formalism’ ‘insulates the law from other social fields; it structures the
law according to standards of “analytical conceptuality, deductive stringency, and rule-
oriented  reasoning”’.33 A  more  substantive  style  of  legal  reasoning  places  more
emphasis  on the ends pursued by lawmakers and on ‘the substantive justice of  the
outcome’ (Craig, 1997, 6).34 
39 This change is more profound than it may first appear. It leads to assessing the legality
of  a  course  of  action  in  light  of  the  fairness  of  its  outcomes.  It  requires  ‘policy
instruments  for  integrative  lawmaking’,  such  as  ‘sustainability  impact  assessments’
(Bürgi Bonanomi, 2015b, 30). It also ‘modulates’ regulatory responses on the basis of
varying socio-economic conditions, for example by specifying impact thresholds that
trigger a state’s responsibility (Musselli, 2017). Under this approach, international tax
rules  should  take  into  account  distributive  dynamics  and outcomes  in  determining
what  constitutes  unlawful  cross-border  transfers,  to  some  extent  collapsing  legal
assessments into social and economic impact assessments. Such an approach goes some
way to  bridging legal  and economic  understandings  of  IFFs,  favouring a  broad and
pragmatic treatment of IFF problematics, as discussed below.
 
4. Unpacking the IFF Agenda? A Pragmatic Approach
40 Maintaining a broad definition of IFFs anchored in law ultimately requires taking a
pragmatic approach when it comes to corresponding measurement of IFFs, research,
and policy making. The key question, addressed below, is how to ‘unpack’ the resulting
IFF work programme, without unravelling the whole IFF agenda.
 
4.1 Unpacking versus Broad Definition
41 Some observers question the policy relevance of an all-inclusive IFF agenda (see for
example Reuter, 2017). They recommend breaking down IFFs into discrete categories
and treating them separately, rather than developing an agenda that treats them as a
single phenomenon. For advocacy purposes, they argue, it has been useful to aggregate
bribery, tax evasion, corporate profit-shifting, currency regulation evasion, criminal
enterprises  and  earnings,  etc.  under  a  single  umbrella.  However,  for  policy  and
research purposes, it is better to disaggregate. 
42 Indeed, there is a need to add ‘granularity’ to the analysis of IFFs, since emphasis on
aggregates tends to conceal key differences in terms of underlying economic and legal
dimensions. It is important to disentangle the various dimensions of the phenomenon
and isolate key variables, including: (1) the sources of the proceeds—whether bribes, tax
evasion or avoidance,  corruption,  currency regulation evasion,  sanctions busting or
earnings from criminal enterprises; (2) the various actors involved—corporate groups or
physical  persons,  public  officials  or  private  persons;  (3)  the  different  push  and  pull
drivers that  motivate  IFFs,  including  tax  differentials,  currency  controls,  or  secrecy
provisions; (4) the geography of IFFs, from source to recipient countries through transit
countries;  and (5) the channels though which illicit  funds flow, ranging from simple
smuggling  to  elaborate  trade-based  money  laundering  techniques.  A  circumstantial
assessment of these facts is needed to appreciate the governance challenges involved in
trying to curb IFFs.
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43 At the same time, the broader notion of IFFs remains useful for policy and research
purposes, leaving aside advocacy aims. There are at least three sets of arguments that
can  be  made  for  a  broad  IFF  agenda.  First,  a  single  IFF  agenda  helps  to  improve
regulatory  coordination,  between  and  within  countries,  across  a  spectrum  of
interventions. An agenda that treats IFFs as a single phenomenon encourages moving
forward  in  a  synchronised  manner  on  multiple  fronts.  It  counters  the  tendency,
inherent  in  legal  specialism,  towards  fragmentation  and  duplication.  Government
actions to tackle the components of IFFs require coordinated responses across different
administrations,  including  revenue  authorities,  banking  supervisors,  financial
intelligence  units,  customs  agencies,  and  law-enforcement  agencies.  An  integrated
agenda highlights the operational interconnectedness of different specialist areas of
law  that  tend  to  operate  in  silos:  money  laundering  and  banking  prudential
requirements,  anti-bribery  laws,  customs  law  and  enforcement,  reporting  and  due
diligence  requirements,  including  professional  standards  for  corporate  service
providers,  and  multiple  exchange  of  information  and transparency  requirements.35 
This holistic approach is necessary to properly address avoidance practices pursued by
businesses:  specifically  targeted  interventions  will  just  spur  new  schemes  to
circumvent them (the ‘balloon effect’);  an integrated package of  coordinated policy
interventions could eventually burst the balloon.
44 Second,  IFFs  differ,  but  they  tend  to  use  similar  techniques  and  facilities:  abusive
offshore structures and devices, secrecy systems, and a host of facilitators, including
the legal profession (Cobham and Janský, 2017; Picciotto, 2018a; 2018b). A single IFF
agenda can converge and heighten regulatory attention on these ‘nerve centres’ of the
IFF  architecture.  Regulatory  efforts  directed  at  these  hotspots  would  likely  have
multiplier effects across the whole spectrum of IFFs, since offshore structures, secrecy
jurisdictions, and facilitators cater to different IFFs simultaneously: they are used to
conceal or launder the proceeds of corruption or earnings from criminal enterprises,
and they facilitate tax avoidance schemes (Picciotto, 2018a; 2018b).
45 Third,  the  IFF  agenda  informs  other  discourses,  leading  to  cross-fertilisation  and
mutual reinforcement of public narratives and work programmes. For example, there
are ‘distinct  areas  of  direct  overlap’  between  the  Domestic  Resource  Mobilization
(DRM) agenda and the IFF agenda (World Bank, 2017). Further, the IFF agenda serves to
inform and deepen the emerging debate on Sustainable Finance (SSF). Overall, DRM and
IFFs,  as  well  as  SSF  and  IFFs,  are  interlinked  at  critical  junctures  in  current
development discourses. These different strands of work can work together to support
comprehensive reform strategies. Cutting off one part of the discourse would weaken
the whole fabric.
46 These considerations encourage use of  a  broad,  but pragmatic agenda,  as  discussed
below. 
 
4.2 A Broad, but Pragmatic Agenda 
47 The arguments outlined above highlight the usefulness of maintaining a broad, flexible
definition of IFFs, within a unified agenda. This brings us back to the initial question:
how can we add ‘granularity’ and operational significance to the IFF work programme,
without  unravelling  the  whole  IFF  agenda?  The  recommended  strategy  is  that  of
keeping a broad, flexible definition of IFFs, and customising it as needed for specific
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analytical or policy purposes (Section 4.2.1). At the same time, the need for a pragmatic
approach  necessitates  breaking  down  the  IFF  agenda  into  workable  modules  and
corresponding indicators (Section 4.2.2).
 
4.2.1 A Broad Definition of IFFs, but Anchored in Law
48 As discussed earlier, the definition of IFFs must be anchored in law, rather than (solely)
ethics, in order to establish more precise, objective contours regarding what counts as
‘illicit  flows’.  Accordingly,  IFFs  should  explicitly  refer  to  cross-border  transfers  of
money or assets connected with some illegal activity. Yet, as discussed, illegality should be
broadly  interpreted.  First,  legal  assessment  should  extend  to  legal  standards  and
doctrines,  going beyond bright-line rules.  Further,  it  should not be confined to the
positive law in force in the assessed jurisdiction; it should also refer to rules and legal
principles  that  have  attracted  wide  international  recognition.  Note  also  that  legal
assessments will increasingly integrate sustainability concerns in the definition of what
counts  as  ‘illicit’  when  embedding  the  IFF  agenda  in  the  sustainable  development
framework.  Altogether,  these  qualifications  invite  a  shift  in  emphasis  from  legal
categorisation to complex balancing tests, and from legal formality to anti-formalist,
substantive legal approaches. 
49 Qualified in this way, the definition of IFFs can accommodate different and competing
definitional approaches and work streams in the IFF arena. Definitional details should
not attract too much attention when discussing a broad IFF policy agenda. Note that
other major reform packages, such as the BEPS programme, lack a clear definition of
relevant concepts. Countries did not need to agree on the definition of ‘value creation’
to endorse the BEPS standards. The definitional uncertainty surrounding the term did
not prevent the adoption of specific practical actions. The same type of ‘constructive
ambiguity’ should play a role in the IFF definitional debate. Nevertheless, the definition
can still be specified and eventually narrowed for specific policy or analytical purposes,
as discussed below.
 
4.2.2 Adding Granularity to the Definition for Measurement, Research, and Policy
Making Purposes
50 For specific  policy  and research purposes,  it  is  necessary to  add granularity  to  the
definition, spelling out what is or is not within its scope in terms of actors, transfer
mechanisms or origin. This ‘scoping’ process is largely discretionary: drawing a line
between what is in scope and what is out of scope is necessarily a subjective exercise,
framed  by  considerations  of  methodological  convenience  and  political  sensitivity.
Eventually,  different  stakeholders  may  use  different  working  definitions  of  IFFs,
tailored  to  specific  analytical  or  policy  purposes,  yet  remaining  under  a  shared
umbrella  definition.  Working  definitions  are  customised;  they  come  with  a  policy
agenda  attached  to  them  (Miyandazi  and  Ronceray,  2018).  But  that  is  hardly
contentious,  as  long  as  stakeholders  are  conscious  of,  and  explicit  about,  the
methodological choices and policy objectives that frame the scoping of their definition. 
51 Some  degree  of  pragmatism  must  also  play  a  role  when  breaking  down  IFFs  into
workable ‘thematic’ modules, or into a taxonomy suitable and distinctive enough for
measurement, particularly with reference to SDG indicators. This involves subdividing
the existing indicator for IFFs described in the SDGs (Indicator 16.4.1 ‘Total value of
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inward and outward illicit  financial  flows,  in  current  United States  dollars’),  which
aggregates  all  IFFs  into  different  sub-indicators.36 As  acknowledged  by  the  UN
constituency,  ‘separate  analysis  of  channels  or  components  is  more  beneficial  in
designing policy responses to prevent illicit flows’ (UN General Assembly, 2017, 2).
52 Here,  it  is  important  not  to  start  from  scratch,  but  rather  to  build  on  existing
operational  work  streams.  In  other  words,  the  taxonomy/categorisation  exercise
should move backward from what exists, in terms of work streams and institutional
frameworks  in  the  UN  system  and  in  related  fora  (Figure  1).  These  work  streams
include,  among  others,  the  Stolen  Asset  Recovery  Initiative,  the  Conference  of  the
States  Parties  to  the United Nations Convention against  Corruption,  UNODC-related
thematic areas, and operational frameworks on countering money-laundering and the
financing  of  terrorism.  The  starting  point  should  be  a  stocktaking  of  existing  IFF-
related  work  streams  that  enjoy  a  high  degree  of  legitimacy,  conducive  to  an
exhaustive inventory of IFF-related thematic areas, with a mapping of the responsible
agencies (see Miyandazi and Ronceray, 2018). The IFF agenda may then build on these
thematic  areas,  spurring  strategic  alignment  and  close  collaboration  between  task
teams across agencies with distinct client engagement (IMF, World Bank, OECD, and
several UN and UN-affiliated agencies). 
 
Figure : IFFs—Main action areas.
Note*: The mainstream public discourse identifies three broad types of IFFs: commercial, criminal,
and corrupt. In practice, the three categories overlap and intertwine.
Source: Authors’ elaboration. For an in-depth review of initiatives targeting IFFs at the African and EU
level, refer to Miyandazi and Ronceray (2018). 
53 Likewise, when establishing or fine-tuning IFF indicators, it is important to consider
existing data sources, and structure indicators in a way that informs and guides policy
reform. Specifically, the analysis should consider regulatory developments in the area
of tax transparency, and the establishment of multiple transparency and exchange-of-
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information frameworks for tax purposes. These disclosure frameworks generate new
data and enable more precise measurement of particular aspects of illicit flows. For
example, automatic exchange procedures in tax matters37 generate data on offshore tax
evasion. As discussed by Cobham and Janský (2018), this data can be used to create a
specific  ‘undeclared  offshore  assets  indicator’.38 Furthermore,  disclosure  laws  on
payments  to  governments,  disclosure  of  tax  avoidance  schemes  and  exchange  of
advance tax rulings, country-by-country reporting, and the development of beneficial
ownership registries shed light on relatively opaque practices. The OECD country-by-
country  reporting  data,  in  particular,  may  be  used  to  construct  an  indicator  of
misaligned profits.39 It is worth considering to what extent national authorities may
build  on  these  transparency  frameworks  and  procedures  to  feed  such  indicators
(Musselli and Bürgi Bonanomi, 2019). The analysis will need to consider built-in limits
to this use: stringent standards on confidentiality, data safeguards, and proper use of
the  information  that  strike  a  suitable  normative  balance  between  transparency
concerns and taxpayers’ rights. 
 
5. Conclusions
54 A broad IFF agenda is a powerful engine for systemic change. It counters the tendency,
inherent in legal specialism, towards fragmentation and duplication; fosters regulatory
coordination across a range of interventions; and promotes policy interventions that
have multiplier effects across the whole spectrum of IFFs. 
55 The ‘umbrella’ definition of IFFs should be anchored in law, rather than ethics, so as to
give precise and objective contours to what constitutes ‘illicit flows’. The definition of
IFFs as cross-border transfers of money or assets connected with some unlawful activity can be
retained as the ‘common denominator definition’. It provides an umbrella definition
for separate work streams corresponding to individual IFF sub-components. 
56 Under  the  ‘umbrella’  definition,  ‘unlawful’  should  be  flexibly  interpreted.  It  should
expand to encompass legal standards that go beyond bright-line rules, allowing scope
for principled decisions, balancing tests, and circumstantial assessment. Further, the
legal assessment should not be confined to the domestic law in force in the assessed
jurisdiction: it should comparatively refer to legal developments in other jurisdictions
and  extend  to  rules  and  principles  of  public  international  law.  By  benchmarking
illegality against legal standards that have attracted wide international acceptance, the
IFF debate would remain anchored in law. At the same time, it would integrate evolving
elements and level the playing field across countries with different lawmaking and law-
enforcement capacity.  If  ‘illegality’  is  constructed in this way, flows associated with
aggressive tax avoidance may be deemed illegal and fall within the scope of the IFF
agenda.
57 A development or revenue–impact approach offers a useful policy orientation to the IFF
debate. Embedded in the sustainable development agenda, it assists in drawing a line
between licit and illicit financial flows while incorporating an ‘impact perspective’. It is
compatible and can be reconciled with a legal definition of IFFs that fully acknowledges
the  role  of  standards  and  balancing  in  lawmaking  and  law  implementation.  The
integration  of  sustainability  concerns  calls  for  a  shift  from  taxonomic  rules  to
circumstantial legal standards, from categorisation to balancing, and from formalism to
non-formalist legal approaches. 
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58 For specific policy and research purposes, it is still necessary to add granularity to the
legal definition of IFFs, by spelling out what is or is not within its scope in terms of
actors,  transfer  mechanisms  or  origin.  The  process  is  necessarily  discretionary,  in
particular  for  reasons  of  methodological  convenience  and  political  sensitivity.  It  is
imperative to  spell  out  methodological  constraints  that  dictate  definitional  choices,
alongside the policy implications that each working definition carries. 
59 A  pragmatic  approach should  inform  the  disaggregation  of  the  IFF  agenda  into
workable  modules  and  corresponding  indicators.  The  starting  point  should  be  a
stocktaking of existing IFF-related international initiatives (and/or initiatives with a
high  degree  of  legitimacy)  conducive  to  an  exhaustive  inventory  of  IFF-related
thematic areas, with a mapping of the responsible agencies. The IFF agenda may build
on these thematic areas, spurring strategic alignment and close collaboration between
task teams across agencies with distinct client engagement. The SDG indicator on IFFs
should be divided into sub-indicators. To the extent possible, this should be understood
as  an  effort  to  refine  the  indicator,  rather  than  revise  it,  in  order  to  avoid  time-
consuming  consensus-building  procedures.  When  refining  IFF  indicators,  it  is
important  to  conform  to  established  concepts  and  standards  from  economics  and
accounting. It is also important to consider the potential of new disclosure frameworks
(AEOI,  CbCR,  etc.).  These  frameworks  generate  new  data  that  may  enable  precise
measurement of particular aspects of illicit flows. There are, however, built-in limits to
the  use  of  such  data,  including  stringent  standards  on  confidentiality,  data
safeguarding, and proper use of information. 
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NOTES
1. The narrow definition essentially covers transfers associated with ‘corruption, illegal natural
resource exploitation, smuggling and trafficking, money laundering, tax evasion and fraud in
international trade’ (World Bank, 2016, 2). 
2. For example, certain tax optimisation schemes that make use of offshore structures to get
around an inconvenient law may still be technically legal, depending on the reach of domestic
anti-abuse rules. The law may not be violated, but the transaction is normatively unacceptable,
hence ‘illicit’, under a normative definition of IFFs (UNCTAD, 2014, 172‒73; Independent Expert
on the Effects of Foreign Debt, 2016, 4; Chowla and Falcao, 2016). 
3. It  echoes  long-standing  distinctions  in  legal  theory  between  positivist  and  natural  law
approaches, and between lex lata and de lege ferenda perspectives. In legal practice, it hints at
some rift between law and justice.
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4. As reviewed by Oats and Tuck (2019, 567–571), the meaning of ‘tax avoidance’ depends on the
context  in  which  the  term is  used.  In  its  widest  sense,  it  covers  all  arrangements  aimed at
reducing,  eliminating  or  deferring  taxes.  In  a  narrow  sense,  as  used  in  this  paper,  it  only
encompasses  ‘aggressive’  tax  avoidance practices  that  artificially  circumvent  the  law for  the
purpose of reducing tax liability. 
5. This can occur through different channels and techniques, including income shifting through
interest  payment (offshore loan structures,  hybrid loan/entity structures,  interest-free loans,
etc.),  royalty payments (IP and cost-contribution agreements, two-tiered IP structures, patent
box  structures),  strategic  transfer  pricing  and  treaty  shopping  (European  Commission,  2015,
2017). These schemes may have a legitimate commercial purpose (legitimate tax planning) or can
be implemented primarily to deliver a tax advantage (aggressive tax planning), depending on the
circumstances of the case. 
6. A rich body of research and theory points to a substantial indeterminacy of legal outcomes,
particularly with regard to the results reached by adjudicators in legal disputes. For a critical
discussion, see, for example, Kress (1989; 1990; 1992), Tushnet (2005) and Woozley (1979). See also
infra, footnote . 
7. As  regards  statutory  construction  and purposive  interpretation ,  courts  generally  interpret  law
provisions purposively. They do not apply a strict letter of the law approach, but instead read
provisions in terms of the purpose of the law as a whole. By interpreting legislation purposively,
the courts can disallow transactions that merely follow the letter of the law but not its intention.
There are, however, limits to this process. Typically, rules of legal interpretation oblige courts to
stick to the wording of the legislation when assessing the objectives of the legislature. Further,
the interpretation of  tax statutes is  not straightforward,  and it  may be difficult  to discern a
reasonably  clear  purpose.  Beyond  statutory  constructs,  common  law  jurisdictions  have
developed  judicial  doctrines  to  counter  tax  avoidance (judicial  anti-abuse  doctrines).  This  goes
beyond  the  purposive  interpretation  of  statutes.  It  entails  judge-made  rules  and  guiding
principles that emerge from the case law. In the United States,  for example,  courts (and the
revenue authority) turn to several doctrines to deal with tax avoidance schemes—for example,
‘substance over form’, ‘sham transactions’, ‘business purpose’, ‘economic substance’, and ‘step
transaction’  doctrines.  Even where  a  taxpayer  carefully  engineers  his,  her,  or  its  scheme to
comply with all technicalities of a particular tax statute, courts could resort to these doctrines to
re-characterise  the  scheme  or  deny  tax  benefits.  The  underlying  principle  is  that  technical
compliance with the law is not enough, if against the spirit of the law. Similar techniques are
used in other jurisdictions to void transactions, re-categorise transactions, or collapse a series of
connected transactions into a single one. Finally, some civil law systems have general theories of
abuse of  law that prevent abuse.  For example,  Swiss law entails general ‘anti-avoidance rules’
(Article 2 (2) Code civil suisse, RO 24 245) that also apply to tax law. In particular, under deeply
rooted abuse of law principles, the law cannot be used for purposes contrary to that for which it
was provided—i.e. no law can provide for its circumvention. 
8. McBarnet and Whelan (1991) focus on the problem of ‘creative compliance’, defined as ‘using
the law to escape legal control without actually violating legal rule’ (at 848). They argue that
‘creative compliance thrives on a narrow legalistic  approach to rules and legal  control,  on a
formalistic  conception  of  law’  and  critically  assess  how  far  anti-formalist  strategies  can  be
pursued through reliance on general principles and general catch-all provision. Their analysis
highlights the obstacles to anti-formalism. Harmon et al. (2015) consider the distinction between
the letter and spirit of the law in relation to contract violation, drawing the following distinction:
‘while the letter of the law represents the explicitly documented expectations, the spirit of the
law represents the undocumented, and often tacitly held, expectations’ (at 498). Since ‘contracts
are inevitably incomplete’, the expectations arising from a contract can be either documented or
not, falling into the letter or spirit of the law (at 498). This gives rise to two types of contract
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violations—letter violations and spirit violations. Minto (2016) specifically focuses on ‘the spirit
behind the letter  of  the law regulating cooperative banks’  as  lying with ‘cooperative banks’’
corporate vision, strategy and tactics’ that strengthen cooperative banks’ resilience to systemic
shock (at 17 and 20).
9. Withholding taxes and exit taxes, though not technically anti-avoidance rules, also play a key
role as an anti-abuse device. 
10. There are many variants in the language of GAARs. Some generally target arrangements that
have the sole or main purpose of achieving a tax advantage (for example, the GAAR enshrined in
the  EU  amended  anti-tax  avoidance  directive).  Others  more  narrowly  target  artificial  and
contrived  avoidance  schemes  that  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  reasonable  course  of  action  in
business (for example, under the UK GAAR). An equivalent tax treaty approach is the ‘principal
purpose test’ (PPT). 
11. In the field of direct taxation, Switzerland’s criminal tax law makes a distinction between
breaches of procedural obligations (violations des obligations de procedure, LIFD Art. 181), tax
evasion (soustraction d’impôts,  LIFD Art. 175), and tax fraud (usage de faux, LIFD Art. 186). Tax
fraud is a qualified form of tax evasion, which implies the use of forged or falsified documents or
the  pursuit  of  other  deliberate  acts  to  cheat  the  tax  administration.  It  is  a  criminal  offense
punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to three years or a monetary penalty. Tax evasion is
a minor offense (a contravention) punishable by a fine, which can reach as much as three times
the sum in tax evaded. See Loi federal sur l’impôt federal direct (LIFD) (RO 1991 1184) and Xavier
Oberson (2008; 2016).
12. In adjudication, ‘law is indeterminate to the extent that authoritive [sic] legal materials and
methods permit multiple outcomes to lawsuits’ (Kress, 1989, 283). In other words, the same rule
may yield different legal outcomes. As reviewed by Hasnas (1995), the indeterminacy argument
was  originally  developed  by  the  legal  realists  on  two grounds—that  the  law is  fraught  with
contradictory rules and that it is always possible for a judge to interpret the rules or the facts of a
case differently. The purpose was to determine that the judge is not independent with regard to
external  influences  and personal  value  judgments.  The indeterminacy  argument  was  further
developed by critical legal scholars, based on the argument that law is radically indeterminate,
incoherent, and contradictory (see in this direction Gordon, 1984, and Kennedy, 1976). 
13. In the United Kingdom, the Committee of Public Accounts (House of Commons) held hearings
in  2012  to  investigate  ‘why some multinational  companies  pay  little  corporation tax  despite
doing a large amount of business in the UK, and why some individuals can get away with using
contrived schemes to avoid tax’ (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 2013, 3). The
assessment found that there was no clarity over where firms drew the line between legitimate
tax planning and aggressive tax avoidance, selling schemes that the firms considered would only
have a 50 per cent chance of being upheld in court if challenged (House of Commons Committee
of Public Accounts, 2013, 5‒7). 
14. The ‘tax gap’ is defined as ‘the difference between tax that is collected and that which is
“theoretically due”’—an estimated USD 40.7 billion (GBP 33 billion) for 2016/17 in the UK, or 5.7
per cent of total tax liabilities (Seely, 2018, 9).
15. Before the tax arrangement is tested in court.
16. A good deal of uncertainty and administrative discretion can attach itself to the question of
whether a particular tax arrangement falls within the intended scope of GAAR. The UK GAAR
strikes down tax arrangements that ‘cannot reasonably be regarded as a reasonable course of
action in relation to the relevant tax provisions’ (Finance Act 2013, c. 29, Part 5, Art. 207 (2)); the
EU GAAR counters schemes that ‘having been put into place for the main purpose or one of the
main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of the applicable
tax law, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances’ (Article 6, Council
Directive  (EU)  2016/1164  of  12  July  2016,  OJ  L  193,  19.7.2016,  p.  1).  In  order  to  mitigate
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uncertainty of legal outcome, general anti-abuse rules are often associated with ‘pre-clearance
mechanisms’,  whereby the taxpayer can approach the tax authority in advance and obtain a
ruling as to whether particular arrangements fall  under the GAAR. Case law and reliance on
advisory panels to delineate abusive arrangements also reduces uncertainty.
17. On rules and standards, see Sullivan (1992) and McBarnet and Whelan (1991). See also Section
3.2.1 infra.
18. It remains open to question whether these anti-abuse principles, recognised in a wide range
of national legal systems, amount to ‘general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’
under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
19. Rules ‘bind a decision-maker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of determined
triggering facts’ while standards ‘collapse decision-making’ into principled decisions that apply a
law’s  purposes  or  principles  to  a  fact  situation  (Sullivan,  1992,  58).  In  practice,  there  is  a
‘continuum’ between rules and standards, as rules may to a varying extent integrate standard-
like language (Sullivan, 1992, 61).
20. Refer  to  footnote above.  To put  it  clearly,  the ‘substance over form’  doctrine makes the
incident  of  taxation dependent  on the  economic  ‘substance’  rather  than the  legal  form of  a
transaction.  A  typical  example  involves  the  debt  vs.  equity  distinction:  if  an  investor  mis-
characterises an equity contribution (non-tax-deductible) as debt (in which case the corporation
may deduct interests payable on the debt), the court may re-characterise the debt as equity for
tax purposes, disallowing the interest deduction.
21. Note that the revenue impact of these practices is not straightforward.  For example,  tax
incentives  may  erode  a  country’s  tax  base,  but  also  attract  additional  investment:  the  net
revenue impacts should be assessed on a case-by-case basis (Matteotti, 2018).
22. A broad IFF agenda is advanced by the African Union, the Economic Commission for Africa,
African Development Bank, Thabo Mbeki Foundation, African Capacity Building Forum, African
Tax Administration Forum, Tax Justice Network-Africa, Pan African Lawyers Union and other
civil society organisations.
23. United  Nations  Sustainable  Development  Summit,  New  York,  25–27  September  2015,
Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN GA Res. 70/1 (adopted on 25
September 2015), downloadable at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/
70/1. 
24. Third International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, N.L., Mexico, 8‒22
March 2002, Addis Ababa Action Agenda, UN GA Res. 69/313 (adopted on 27 July 2015), downloadable
at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/313&Lang=E.
25. Soft law goals and objectives assist in interpreting and applying international law rules, and
shape the emergence of new rules under international law and domestic law. They are formally
relevant in interpreting treaty law as ‘context’, under Article 31 (3) of the Vienna Convention on
the  Law  of  Treaties  (VCLT),  if  they  find  expression  in  a  discernible  pattern  of  acts  and
pronouncements. They can also be relevant as a supplementary means of interpretation, under
Article 32 of the VCLT, when a consistent pattern is not discernible. At the domestic level, they
may frame and prompt law reforms aimed at enabling effective implementation of the SDGs.
26. Such ‘particularisation’ of the law is rooted in equitable constructs. On the role of equity ‘as a
basis for “individualised” justice tempering the rigours of strict law’, see Schachter (1982, 74).
See also Schwarzenberger (1966), Cottier (2015), and, for an application to international trade
law, Musselli (2017). 
27. This  results  from  the  fact  that  ‘sustainable  development  policies  are  generally  located
“somewhere in between”’, and prompt questions as to the substantive coherence of legal regimes
(Bürgi Bonanomi, 2015b, 30).
28. Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that ‘[e]very
human being has the inherent right to life’. The right to life is inextricably linked to the rights
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guaranteed by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, such as the
right to food, the right to shelter, or the right to water
29. When a state has ratified the relevant human rights  instruments,  its  courts  may uphold
human rights as excuses for otherwise wrongful acts, to the extent that judges are required to
enforce domestic laws in ways that do not encroach on a state’s obligation to respect human
rights.
30. In particular, countries whose tax policies have adverse livelihood impacts on other countries
may stand in breach of their duty of international cooperation and assistance, as enshrined in
the UN Charter (Articles 55 and 56), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 28), the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Article 3 ), the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (and Articles 4, 24(4) and 28(3)) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (Articles 2(1) and 11(1)) (Luisiani and Cosgrove, 2019). 
31. Under the ‘no harm’ principle of international law, a state is duty-bound to protect other
states  from  harmful  effects  caused  by  activities  within  its  territory.  The  principle  has  been
applied in relation to transboundary environmental harm and international watercourses. 
32. Some  developments  move  in  this  direction.  Interestingly,  the  2015  AAAA  includes  a
commitment by member states ‘to assess the impact of their policies on sustainable development’
and Article 208(1) of the Lisbon Treaty obliges EU Members to take development objectives into
account in the implementation of  sectoral  policies.  A growing number of  experts  argue that
countries have a duty under international law to assess and redress the potential extraterritorial
impacts of their laws, policies and practices (ETO Consortium 2013, 7 (Principle 14)). 
33. Teubner  (1983,  256).  On  legal  formalism and  anti-formalist  responses  in  accounting  and
taxation, see McBarnet and Whelan (1991).
34. In accounting and taxation laws, anti-formalist approaches entail ‘capturing and controlling
the substance rather than the form of a real life transaction or relationship, and implementing
the spirit rather than the letter of the law’ (McBarnet and Whelan, 1991, 854).
35. The last  of  these include,  for example,  exchange of  information between tax au Cobham
thorities, whether automatic or on request; disclosure of tax avoidance schemes and exchange of
advance tax rulings; country-by-country reporting; and the development of beneficial ownership
registries.
36. Splitting the SDG indicator into different sub-indicators may amount to a refinement or a
revision, depending on whether small or substantive changes are involved. While refinements of
SDG indicators  do not  require formal  adoption by the United Nations Statistical  Commission
(UNSC), revisions will be considered twice, in March 2020 and in March 2025, for formal adoption
by the UNSC after global consultation. Different indicators should capture different types of IFFs,
by component and channel. Some even argue for ‘modularity’ of IFF indicators, so as to factor in
the context-specific  revenue and development impacts  of  IFFs,  and for  ‘politically  actionable
indicators’,  allowing  for  targeted  anti-IFF  strategies  in  specific  local  contexts  (Khan  and
Andreoni, 2018).
37. This  refers  to  the  Standard  for  Automatic  Exchange  of  Financial  Account  Information,
developed by the OECD with G20 countries.
38. Defined as ‘the excess of the value of citizens’ assets declared by participating jurisdictions
under the OECD Common Reporting Standard, over the value declared by citizens themselves for
tax purposes to their tax authorities’ (Cobham and Janský, 2018)
39. Calculated as ‘the total excess profits declared in jurisdictions with a greater share of profits
than would be aligned with their share of economic activity’ (Cobham and Janský, 2018)
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ABSTRACTS
This article reviews and challenges some key tenets of the debate on illicit financial flows (IFFs),
and articulates some lines of  legal  reasoning that can help to define the boundaries of  what
constitutes illicit flows (or not). The analysis challenges the ‘narrow’ definition of IFFs, arguing
that  it  mis-characterises  the legal  terrain.  It  then brings  much-needed clarity  to  the ‘broad’
definition of IFFs, by anchoring it in legal concepts, rather than ethics. The analysis tackles two
further contested areas in the debate: the tension between ‘development’ and ‘legal’ approaches
to IFFs, and aggregate versus disaggregate approaches under the IFF agenda. In these areas, the
analysis briefly rehearses the state of the debate, questions some entrenched assumptions, and
presents  ideas  that  help  to  reconcile  conflicting  views.  It  bridges  development  and  legal
perspectives by firmly embedding the legal discourse in the Sustainable Development Agenda
and the SDGs. It concludes with some summary observations.
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